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Abstract. Kelsen and Schmitt, two leading legal theorists of the twentieth century, constitute
a powerful pair that sheds light on the intertwining of politics and law in the phenomenon of
sovereignty. Although their conceptions of sovereignty are far apart, they are interconnected
as different ways of making sense of the same social phenomenon, or what I call the ‘practice
of sovereignty’, whereby an ultimately unauthorised authority continuously authorises itself as
the authority and the rest by and large accept this, acquiesce in this, or are made to do so.
Having clarified their differences and interconnection, I explore some of the implications of the
two writers’ differing conceptions of sovereignty and of the practice of sovereignty that
underlie them.
Introduction
Sovereignty is a notoriously elusive concept and it is the aim of this article to try to
arrive at a better understanding of it through the reading of Kelsen and Schmitt, two
leading legal theorists of the twentieth century.1
Faced with the often confused discussions about sovereignty, some academic
specialists suggest that the word ‘sovereign(ty)’ appears in different contexts and
means different things. This was already noted by Jellinek when he observed: ‘The
sovereign organ within a state and the sovereign state are two totally different
things’.2 A somewhat more detailed discussion is found in Manning, an early
contributor to the conceptual analysis of sovereignty within the discipline of
International Relations:
What all too many writers seem not to notice is that by this same term, sovereignty, there
are commonly connoted more concepts than one. To state, as Austin did, that sovereignty
in Britain lies with the monarch, the lords and the electorate, acting in their collective, or
* This article has gone through two fairly radical revisions. I am grateful to Jenny Edkins, Andrew
Linklater, Rob Walker, Howard Williams, Michael Williams, and Pete Wright for their comments
and criticisms.
1 My focus here is on ‘state sovereignty’ but, I will argue, this is sustained by a broader practice of
sovereignty, which also underlies other authorities. Informative works on Kelsen and Schmitt
include: David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller
in Weimar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of
Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001).
2 Georg Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd edn. (Bad Homburg von der Höhe: Gentner, 1960),
p. 458.
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corporate, capacity as ‘the sovereign number’, may or may not be found illuminating. But
it is quite different from saying, with equal propriety, that sovereignty belongs in the case
of Britain, as in that of other sovereign states, to the state as such, as an international
person, a performer upon the international stage. And to say that the sovereignty of the
sovereign state suffers abatement each time a new obligation is accepted is to use the term
in a third kind of context and a third sort of widely accepted sense. What, when used in
this third sense, is sovereignty but the sum total, at any given moment, of a states [sic]
existing liberties? Sovereignty in this third context is a variable residue, composed of those
of its original legal freedoms with which the state has not found occasion to part.3
According to this way of thinking, there are domestically and internationally
relevant senses of the word ‘sovereignty’ and there is more than one meaning
internationally. Sovereignty-sense-number-one, to paraphrase Manning, points to
the supreme political authority within a state; sovereignty-sense-number-two refers to
the quality that makes a state an international person; and sovereignty-sense-
number-three is the sum of international legal freedoms a state enjoys at any
particular moment.
This line of thinking I tentatively call ‘nominalism’ in this article in contradistinc-
tion to ‘essentialism’. Unlike the latter, the former denies the existence of the one true
meaning of ‘sovereignty’ and suggests that ‘sovereignty’ is a name attaching to
different substances.4 ‘Nominalism’, as defined here, can help us avoid dogmatic
‘essentialism’, but it does not always work well. Among the relatively recent, and
widely-cited, works on sovereignty within the field of IR, Krasner’s Sovereignty:
Organized Hypocrisy illustrates this point well.5
In addition to what he calls ‘domestic sovereignty’, corresponding to Manning’s
sovereignty-sense-number-one, Krasner identifies three internationally relevant
senses of ‘sovereignty’. These are ‘international legal sovereignty’, ‘Westphalian
sovereignty’ and ‘interdependence sovereignty’. The first of these corresponds
roughly to Manning’s sovereignty-sense-number-two. The second – or what Kranser
also calls ‘the principle of autonomy’6 – is roughly equal to the state’s (supposed)
freedom to do as it pleases within its territory. The third is roughly interchangeable
with national autarky/territorial impermeabilty.
When I compare Manning’s and Krasner’s classificatory schemes, it strikes me as
significant that neither of Krasner’s latter two types (‘Westphalian sovereignty’ and
‘interdependence sovereignty’) finds a place in Manning’s list of possible senses of
‘sovereignty’. Clearly, Manning knew that ‘sovereign’ states did not have ‘sover-
eignty’ in either of these two senses. It is also my view (and Krasner’s as well) that
there has been no such thing as a Westphalian sovereign state in his sense. It is
unsurprising therefore that he finds this ‘sovereignty’ regularly ‘violated’. He is right
to say that his Westphalian model is empirically inaccurate (and also right to note
that the principle of non-intervention has been violated from time to time). But his
key contention that states engage in ‘organized hypocrisy’ by pretending to respect
3 C. A. W. Manning, ‘The Legal Framework in a World of Change’, in B. Porter (ed.), The
Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919–1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972),
p. 308.
4 I am aware that this is not how philosophers distinguish ‘nominalism’ and ‘essentialism’, but I
prefer these terms to, say, ‘pluralism’ and ‘monism’.
5 The following summary is based on my reading of Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized
Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
6 Krasner, Sovereignty, p. 82.
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the ‘governing principle, autonomy’7 is based on an erroneous assumption that the
principle of complete domestic autonomy ever existed in the relations of sovereign
states.
As James points out, ‘anyone with even the most cursory acquaintance with
international law knows that sovereign states’ do not have complete domestic
autonomy – of the sort Krasner feeds into his conception of Westphalian sover-
eignty.8 Bodin, well-known for his definition of ‘sovereignty’ as ‘absolute and
perpetual power’, also famously added: ‘If we insist however that absolute power
means exemption from all law whatsoever, there is no prince in the world who can be
regarded as sovereign, since all the princes of the earth are subject to the laws of God
and of nature, and even to certain human laws common to all nations’.9 Even Vattel,
a strong advocate of sovereign equality and non-intervention, stated: ‘if a prince, by
violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a lawful cause for resisting him; if,
by his insupportable tyranny, he brings on a national revolt against him, any foreign
power may rightfully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its aid’.10
Moreover, as Krasner himself acknowledges, even the ‘Peace of Westphalia con-
tained extensive provisions for religious toleration between Catholics and Protestants
in Germany’. It was, he adds, ‘precisely the fact that rulers . . . accepted inter-
nationally legitimated restraints on their own right to act as they pleased within their
own territory, that made it possible to escape the state of nature resulting from
sectarian warfare’.11 There was then no principle of complete domestic autonomy, no
such thing as the Westphalian sovereign state in Krasner’s sense, and hence no
hypocrisy either.
What this example illustrates is this: that what I am tentatively calling here a
nominalist approach to the concept of sovereignty will not help us understand the
subject better if the analyst makes up the various meanings of the word ‘sovereignty’
as s/he likes in disregard of the historically contingent institutional structure of the
world (or of what could plausibly be presented as such). Krasner’s ‘Westphalian
sovereignty’ never was an aspect of the institutional structure even of the
Westphalian world.
This is my key reason for drawing attention to the work of Kelsen in this article
as he is, to my mind, among the most meticulous interpreters of the world’s
institutional structure, domestic and international included. In this article, I contrast
Kelsen’s conception of sovereignty with that of Schmitt, whose ideas have drawn
considerable attention among some IR specialists recently in part because of his
connection with one of the founding figures of the discipline, Morgenthau.12
For my part, I want to compare Schmitt and Kelsen for a number of reasons. For
one thing, Schmitt, unlike Kelsen, was an essentialist; rather than presenting a set of
contextual paraphrases of the term ‘sovereignty’, Schmitt formulated what to him
7 Ibid., p. 152.
8 Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis of International Society (London: Allen & Unwin,
1986), p. 229.
9 Jean Bodin, Six Books on the Commonwealth, abridged and translated by M. J. Tooley (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1967), pp. 25, 28.
10 Emmeric de Vattel, The Law of Nations, trans. by C. G. Fenwick (Washington, DC: Carnegie
Institution, 1916), II, iii, 56.
11 Krasner, Sovereignty, pp. 33, 82.
12 See, for example, Michael Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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was the essence of sovereignty as a political phenomenon. So the contrast is
interesting. Moreover, despite his stature as an eminent legal theorist of the twentieth
century with some important messages to impart, Kelsen has been almost entirely
neglected in the contemporary IR discussion of sovereignty; and there is also a case
for presenting Schmitt’s ideas, with some precision, to the IR audience to whom they
are still relatively unfamiliar – especially when some key aspects of Schmitt’s
argument appears worryingly relevant to understanding contemporary practices of
sovereign states. But, more fundamentally, I compare Kelsen and Schmitt because no
pair that I can readily think of, from among the more recent contributors to the
debates about state sovereignty, quite matches this pair in enabling us to consider the
intertwining of law and politics in the phenomenon of sovereignty so economically
and forcefully.
In this article, I am also interested exploring what sovereignty may mean in the
sense of what may follow from (differing conceptions of) sovereignty. For instance,
does non-intervention really follow from sovereignty as is commonly asserted in
standard IR texts and regular foreign policy pronouncements? Does state sovereignty
necessarily breed arbitrary violence as is increasingly feared in the current political
climate of ‘war on terror’? Is sovereignty a relatively benign factor or, on the
contrary, a pernicious one for the pursuit of international or cosmopolitan goals? By
way of bringing some order to the field cluttered with contentious opinions, I want
to see what follows from the two rather different, though interconnected, conceptu-
alisations of sovereignty found in the writings of Kelsen and Schmitt – for, I believe,
their contending conceptions shed valuable light on the presence of divergent views
about the implications of sovereignty.
In the next section I explain Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty, how it relates to his
other ideas, especially the sovereign right of war. I note in passing a close affinity
between Schmitt’s notion of sovereignty and Morgenthau’s. I move then to Kelsen’s
idea of sovereignty which, by contrast, does not entail any substantive sovereign
rights at all. In explicating Kelsen’s idea, I refer, in passing, to the argument of his
Vienna School followers, Verdross and Kunz, and briefly compare their view of state
sovereignty with a closely related formulation by Manning and his English School
disciple, James. This is not because I specially want to spell out the English School
view of sovereignty (which, incidentally, is not unified). I refer to Manning and
James, the latter being the most dedicated analyst of sovereign statehood within the
English School, simply because they help us understand better Kelsen’s position and
its relationship with Schmitt’s. I then move on to show that, despite the apparent
disjunctions in these writers’ views of ‘sovereignty’, they all share an understanding
of a key aspect of our social life, or what I shall call ‘the practice of sovereignty’, the
precise meaning of which will be explained later. I argue that in this sense their
divergent renditions of ‘sovereignty’ are interconnected. In the final section, I briefly
examine some standard contentions about sovereignty’s implications, paying
attention to Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s conceptions as well as what unites the two.
I should enter a few disclaimers at this point. First, it is not my aim here to present
a historical survey of the changing conceptions of ‘sovereignty’,13 much less to
13 Compare Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates & Sovereigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994); Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995); Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social
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explore a timeless definition of it,14 or to engage in the survey of the contemporary
IR literature on sovereignty.15 My purpose is to analyse Schmittian and Kelsenian
conceptions of sovereignty, examine how they interrelate, and, on that basis, to build
a first step towards a more careful analysis of the implications of sovereignty. Second,
this article is an exercise in conceptual analysis. Empirical study which builds on such
an analysis is contemplated, but goes beyond the scope of the present article. Third,
I focus here on state sovereignty and do not deal with national or popular
sovereignty. However, the advocates of popular or national sovereignty may endorse
the division of the world into sovereign states, or they may be critical of it; either way,
they, too, will need to think carefully about state sovereignty and its implications.16
Fourth, due to space limitation, I will not deal with the question of the erosion (or
otherwise) of state sovereignty in the face of the increased role of non-state
actors17 – although, in my view, the Kelsen-Schmitt contrast also gives an important
insight into the reason why the debate on this issue remains inconclusive.
Schmitt, the political, and the sovereign right of war
Schmitt’s idea of ‘sovereignty’ is grounded in his concept of ‘the political’.18 For him,
‘the political’ is a category of human activity comparable with ‘the moral, aesthetic,
and economic’ in that they each involve an antithetical distinction. In morality, the
final distinction may be between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in
economics profitable and unprofitable. Since these distinctions are independent of
one another, the corresponding realms, according to Schmitt, are mutually
independent.
In his considered view, the specifically ‘political’ distinction, upon which ‘political’
actions and motives are rooted, is that between friend and enemy.19 And, according
Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1999); Hideaki Shinoda, Re-Examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the Global Age
(Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 2000); Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty:
How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001);
Constantin Fasolt, The Limits of History (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2004).
14 Philpott identifies ‘supreme authority within a territory’ as the core meaning of ‘sovereignty’ which,
according to him, is ‘broad enough to encompass much of the diversity, but discrete enough to be
useful’. Philpott, Revolutions, p. 16. This serves his purpose well. By contrast, this article seeks a
much finer analysis of two key conceptions of sovereignty and their implications, and it will not do
to stop at a rough idea.
15 One example of this is John Hoffman, Sovereignty (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998),
which, however, I did not find very helpful.
16 In Philip Cunliffe’s view, ‘Popular sovereignty . . . cannot belong to the body of the people separate
from the state’. Whether ‘the state’ in this context has to be a ‘sovereign’ state, and in what sense, is
an interesting question. See Cunliffe, ‘Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility’, in Christopher
J. Bickerton, Philip Cunliffe and Alexander Gourevitch (eds.), Politics without Sovereignty: A
Critique of Contemporary International Relations (London: London University College, London
Press, 2007), pp. 39–57 at p. 50.
17 See a succinct summary in Philpott, Revolutions, pp. 24–5; and, in more detail, an excellent
collection of essays, Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker (eds.), The Emergence of Private
Authority in Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
18 The following is based on my reading of Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. by
George Schwab (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 25–7.
19 Schmitt uses ‘he’ to refer to ‘the enemy’ but, he says, ‘[t]he enemy is not the private adversary
whom one hates’; ‘[a]n enemy exists only when . . . one fighting collectivity of people confronts a
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to him, ‘the political’ is an independent category because, he argues, none of the other
distinctions, such as good and evil, is necessary or sufficient for this distinction. He
adds that, measured in terms of the degree of intensity of bonding, ‘[t]he distinction
of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation,
of an association or dissociation’.20
Intriguingly, however, Schmitt envisages that human motives other than the
political may be ‘sufficiently strong’ to bring about the emergence of the friend-and-
enemy (or ‘political’) grouping. But he also suggests that those motives ‘intensify’ to
the political level such that the motives are ‘no longer purely religious, moral, or
economic, but political’?21 There is some confusion here. On the one hand,
non-political motives may be strong enough to make the contending groups
‘political’; on the other hand, such motives may intensify to the level where the
groups become ‘political’. This tends to suggest that it is the mere intensity of
association/dissociation that constitutes ‘the political’; but then the political will no
longer be a distinct category.22
One possible answer to this puzzle is found in the following consideration. Schmitt
explains that a class in the Marxian sense ceases to be something purely economic
and becomes a political factor when, for example, Marxists approach the class
struggle seriously and treat the class adversary as a real enemy and fight him either
in the form of a war of a state against state or in a civil war within a state.23 He then
adds: ‘The real battle is then of necessity no longer fought according to economic
laws but has . . . its political necessities and orientations, coalitions and compromises,
and so on’.24 Here Schmitt appears to subscribe to a fairly common conception of the
political as necessarily involving ‘prudence’. The antithetical distinction constituting
‘the political’ in Schmitt’s thinking may therefore be ‘prudent-imprudent’ from the
viewpoint of the survival of the political entity and its identity. This interpretation is
supported by his suggestion that ‘the politically reasonable course [could] reside in
avoiding war’,25 where the adverb, ‘politically’ can be understood to mean ‘along the
prudent-imprudent axis’. Some such modification appears necessary to make sense of
Schmitt’s elusive concept of ‘the political’ as a distinct category.
Be that as it may, the distinctive function of politics, according to Schmitt, is to
draw a line between friend and enemy and to decide whether or not an extreme
situation has arisen, necessitating the resort to war and other emergency measures,
such as the suspension of the constitution. This is the basis of his well-known
definition of ‘sovereign’ as ‘he who decides on the exception’.26 To illustrate how the
key concepts work in his scheme, Schmitt wrote that under Bismarck there was no
similar collectivity’. Importantly, ‘the enemy’ is not a ‘foe’ that has to be annihilated: ‘the enemy’ is
a public enemy ‘who fights against us’, who needs only to be ‘compelled to retreat into his borders’.
Schmitt is critical of such crusading ideas as ‘war to end all wars’ or ‘war fought in the name of
humanity’. Schmitt, The Concept, pp. 28, 29n, 36, 54.
20 Ibid., p. 26.
21 Ibid., p. 36, emphasis added.
22 See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer, p. 436, on Morgenthau’s influence on Schmitt on this
point. I do not think, however, that Schmitt can be said to have abandoned the idea of the political
as a distinct category.
23 Schmitt, The Concept, p. 37.
24 Ibid., p. 37, emphasis added.
25 Ibid., p. 33.
26 Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. by George Schwab
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), p. 5.
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effective opposition by the Church, the trade unions or other such non-state groups
against the government of the German Reich if, in some extreme cases, it wanted to
wage war. This, for Schmitt, showed the presence of ‘sovereignty’, a ‘political entity’,
a ‘decisive entity’, ‘the supreme, that is, in the decisive case, the authoritative
entity’.27
It is not entirely clear from the relevant passage, however, where precisely Schmitt
thought this ‘sovereignty’ was located; who he was that, in Schmitt’s own formula,
possessed ‘sovereignty’. Was it Bismarck? Was it the government of the German
Reich? Or was it the Reich itself? That this is not entirely clear is itself significant – for
it tends to show that Schmitt was not centrally concerned with the juridical
questioning regarding the precise location of sovereignty at any rate in the works
cited here.
Following Schmitt closely, however, Morgenthau wrote:
that authority within the state is sovereign which in case of dissension among the different
law making factors has the responsibility for making the final binding decision and which
in a crisis of law enforcement, such as revolution or civil war, has the ultimate
responsibility for enforcing the laws of the land. That responsibility must rest
somewhere – or nowhere, but it cannot be both here and there at the same time . . . If it
rests nowhere . . . in times of constitutional crisis either one of the constitutional authorities
will usurp that responsibility, or else revolution will invest somebody, a Napoleon or a
Council of People’s Commissars, with supreme authority to end chaos and to establish
peace and order.28
But, for Schmitt, it was the nature of the grouping that was more important than the
question of who the sovereign was/was to be within it. He wrote:
that grouping is always political which orients itself toward this most extreme possibility [of
war]. This grouping is therefore always the decisive human grouping, the political entity. If
such an entity exists at all, it is always the decisive entity, and it is sovereign in the sense
that the decision about the critical situation, even if it is the exception, must always
necessarily reside there.29
Here Schmitt is talking of the entire grouping as a sovereign political entity.
Moreover, in his view, the sovereign quality of a political entity resides there
continuously although it is in times of crisis that it most clearly manifests itself.
In short, the state, when it functions and qualifies as a properly political entity, is
the supreme authority in the sense of the authoritative-entity-in-decisive-cases that
makes decisions to resort to war against its enemy, internal or external, when it
judges it necessary to do so. For Schmitt, therefore, the right to resort to war is
intrinsic to the state as a political entity: ‘To the state as an essentially political entity
belongs the jus belli’.30
This was in fact a fairly common view before the First World War and perhaps
especially so in Germany.31 The main contention then was that this primordial
right of sovereign states to declare war to settle international disputes, unresolved
by diplomacy, should not be compromised by stipulating new pacifist-inspired
27 Schmitt, The Concept, pp. 43–4.
28 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered’, Columbia Law Review, 48 (1948),
p. 361.
29 Schmitt, The Concept, p. 38.
30 Ibid., p. 45.
31 A good example is found in Karl von Stengel, Weltstaat und Friedenspropblem (Berlin: Reichl,
1909).
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international legal obligations. But such a view was not confined to ‘bellicist’ writers.
It is well known, for example, that the US refusal to join the League of Nations was
partly based on the claim that the US Congress’s constitutional right to declare war
should not be compromised. Now, in its ‘war on terror’, the US argues that the
constitutional right of the President as the Commander-in-Chief entitles him to
sanction (what amounts to) torture in interrogation, notwithstanding the Convention
against Torture and the relevant US statute that implements its international legal
obligation in this regard.32
Kelsen, Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit, and constitutional independence
Kelsen is well-known for his hierarchical view of the law and his insistence that the
state is nothing other than a personification/hypostatisation of a national legal
system.33 He took seriously the question of whether national legal systems were
logically prior to (and in that sense, higher than) the international legal system or, on
the contrary, the latter was logically prior to (and higher than) the former. He
considered that ‘sovereignty’ was a quality attributable exclusively to the highest
legal system,34 so that, in his view, there were only two theoretical alternatives: either
national legal systems were sovereign or the international legal system was.35
Setting up the problem in this way, Kelsen, however, came to the view that
whether positive international law is logically prior to/higher than national legal
systems in the hierarchy of norms is undecidable on any objective grounds. For him,
this was a matter of subjective choice based on differing world views.36 Despite this
indecision, he added one important observation: if international law is to be thought
of as being logically prior to/higher than national legal systems in the worldwide
hierarchy of norms, then the international legal system is ‘the highest sovereign legal
order’; but if ‘the states – that is, the national legal orders – are nevertheless referred
to as ‘‘sovereign’’, then this ‘‘sovereignty’’ can only mean that the national legal
orders are subordinated only to the international legal order’.37
Verdross and Kunz, however, went beyond Kelsen and argued that the logical
primacy of the international legal system over national legal systems can be
demonstrated objectively.38 This amounts to an assertion that the international legal
32 See Office of Legal Counsel, US Department of Justice, ‘Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President – Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18
U.S.C.§§2340–2340A’, 1 August 2002.
33 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. by Max Knight (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1970), pp. 221–78, 286–319.
34 Kelsen, Pure Theory, p. 199.
35 This is a theoretical question about how to make sense of international/national law. It should not
be confused with a substantive legal question regarding the consequences of a possible conflict
between international law binding a particular state and the national law of that state. See further
Kelsen, Pure Theory, pp. 328ff.
36 He contrasted subjectivism (atomism, egoism) and objectivism (a society-centred view) as underlying
the two opposing interpretations. He warned that subjectivism would lead to the view that only one
state is sovereign, but did not think that this was a scientifically untenable interpretation. Kelsen,
Pure Theory, pp. 339ff.
37 Ibid., p. 217; emphasis original.
38 Their (in my view correct) argument was that the primacy-of-national-law view could not explain
the binding nature of customary international law without recourse to a fiction that it was based on
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system (or its hypostatisation, the international legal community) is ‘sovereign’.
However, in line with Kelsen’s acknowledgement, Verdross and Kunz also suggested
that there was a sense in which states could be called ‘sovereign’, but that
‘sovereignty’ then could only mean sovereign states’ ‘Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit’
(‘being in unmediated contact with/directly obligated by international law’). It is
important to note that Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit is a status or ‘a fullness of
competences’,39 and not itself a set of legal rights. What rights sovereign states have
will need to be determined in the light of the historically contingent content of the law
of which they are unmediated subjects.40
This line of thinking accords with Kelsen’s rejection of the doctrine of the
fundamental rights of states.41 State sovereignty entails no specific legal rights for, in
his view, they can only derive from the law and the rights of states can only be
identified through an analysis of historically contingent positive international law.
There is therefore no such thing as fundamental rights of states that are trans-
historical and intrinsic to the very idea of the state. The right of war, contrary to
Schmitt’s contention, is not intrinsic to state sovereignty – for there is no right that
is intrinsic to it, according to Kelsen.
Amplifying Kelsen’s thinking, Kunz explains: ‘Sovereign Britain was, in 1914, free
to go to war, but not in 1933; sovereign Brazil, which is neither bound by the League
of Nations Covenant nor by the Kellogg Pact, was free to do so even in 1933’.42
Furthermore, ‘[t]he domestic affairs are not such in virtue of their inherent nature and
cannot be determined a priori – no affair is necessarily a ‘‘domestic affair’’ – but only
by analyzing the positive international law. In 1933, the treatment of her minorities
is a domestic affair for France, but not for Poland; but in both cases this is so in virtue
of the supraordinated international law.’43 And, Kunz adds, it was Kelsen’s merit to
have shown ‘that the ‘‘equality’’ of [sovereign] states is possible only under the
supposition that international law is supraordinated to the single states . . . all states
are ‘‘equal’’ because they are all subordinated in the same way to international law’.44
Thus, not even so-called ‘sovereign equality’ is an inherent right of sovereign states,
but only a historically contingent institutional fact that all sovereign states are
equally bound by positive international law.45
states’ tacit consent; and that it failed to explain why international law was binding on states after
revolutionary changes of their constitutions. Josef Kunz, ‘The ‘‘Vienna School’’ and International
Law’, in Kunz (ed.), The Changing Law of Nations: Essays on International Law (Ohio State
University Press, 1968), p. 85.
39 Kunz, ‘The ‘‘Vienna School’’ ’, p. 85.
40 In addition to sovereign states, insurgents in a civil war have long been recognised in international
law as subjects with certain rights and duties. There are other entities in world politics which
international law may be said in some exceptional cases to confer a very limited degree of
international legal personality/competence, for example, the UN, individuals and companies. See
Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th edn (London:
Routledge, 1977), pp. 91–108. But a ‘fullness of competences’ in international law belongs
exclusively to sovereign states.
41 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg, reissue (New York: Russell &
Russell, 1961), pp. 248–54.
42 Kunz, ‘The ‘‘Vienna School’’ ’, p. 86. In the absence of a relevant legal constraint, Kunz is saying,
states are free to go to war. By contrast, Schmitt’s contention was that sovereign states had a
fundamental right of war. What Kelsen denies, and Schmitt seems to insist on, is the very possibility
of such a right prior to international law.
43 Ibid., p. 86.
44 Ibid., p. 86.
45 Kelsen, General Theory, pp. 252–4.
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Central to the Vienna School’s conception of state sovereignty outlined above is
the distinction between a member state of a federal union and the federal union itself.
It is argued that the former is not a sovereign entity because it is not in direct contact
with international law whereas the latter is sovereign because international law binds
it directly.46 This way of contrasting those states which are ‘sovereign’ and those
‘states’ which are not is also found in Manning and James.47 As Schmitt explains,
‘[i]n the newly founded German Reich it became necessary after 1871 to advance a
principle for distinguishing the authority of member states from the federal state. On
the basis of this principle, the German theory of the state distinguishes between the
concept of sovereignty and the concept of the state’.48 It is interesting that the Vienna
School of Jurisprudence and the English School of International Relations appear
both to have inherited the idea of sovereignty – rooted in the historically specific
experience of nineteenth-century Germany – as that which, among other things,
distinguishes a federation from its member states.
However, neither Manning nor James equates sovereign statehood with
Völkerrechtsunmittelbarkeit. For Manning, ‘sovereign statehood’ does not mean
‘unmediated subordination to international law’ for, logically, it would be possible
for there to be sovereign states without them creating an international society
governed by international law. Therefore, ‘international law’ cannot be conceptually
integral to the definition of ‘sovereign statehood’.49 ‘Sovereignty’ of the ‘sovereign
state’, for Manning, is definable not in terms of ‘subordination to international law’
but in terms of what he called ‘constitutional insularity or self-containedness’50 – or
what James, following Manning, later called ‘constitutional independence’.51
The interconnection of Kelsen and Schmitt
The view that international law (or international legal community) is sovereign – a
view towards which Kelsen was sympathetic (and Verdross and Kunz accepted) –
and Schmitt’s view of state sovereignty based on the concept of the political appear
so wide apart as to be unbridgeable. But, as I explain below, the two conceptions are
aspects or effects of their different ways of making sense of a social universe they
experience or assume in common.
It is important to note that the single most important principle which guides
Kelsen’s thinking is the logical principle of ‘no ‘‘ought’’ from ‘‘is’’ ’ associated with
Hume: only a norm can beget a norm, Kelsen insists, so that any norm or normative
system must be traced back logically to the highest norm of all, or what he called ‘the
46 Ibid., pp. 308–28; Kunz, ‘The ‘‘Vienna School’’ ’, pp. 98ff.
47 See, in particular, James, Sovereign Statehood, pp. 26–30.
48 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 17.
49 Manning, ‘The Legal Framework’, p. 307.
50 Ibid., p. 308.
51 James, Sovereign Statehood. According to him, the word ‘sovereignty’ is used to mean a number of
things, but when it is used to refer to the condition of the membership of international society it means
the state’s constitutional independence. It is worth noting here that, even though international law
does not form part of James’ articulation of the concept of sovereign statehood, what he interprets
as a key institutional feature of the world does, namely the idea that the world is organised as a
society of sovereign states which has a clear membership rule.
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basic norm’.52 Kelsen, as we saw, considered that the logical primacy of international
law over the national legal systems could not be demonstrated objectively. But he
clearly sympathised with the idea of the primacy of international law.53 When he
tentatively accepted that the positive international legal system was indeed higher
than national legal systems, he argued that the basic norm of all legal systems must,
in that case, be the basic norm of positive international law. And he argued that this
basic norm ‘establishes custom among states as a law-creating fact’54 and stipulates
that ‘[t]he States ought to behave as they have customarily behaved’.55
But the whole intellectual enterprise of seeking the origins of positive legal norms
in the so-called basic norm is doomed. All it achieves is a redundant circular
reassurance that when we consider a legal system to be a source of obligation, it is
implicit in our thought that we ought to treat that system as a source of obligation.
It is unsurprising therefore that Kelsen eventually came close to abandoning his
doctrine of the basic norm altogether.56 But if we take the view that the enterprise of
looking for a normative foundation of positive law is bound to fail, we will have to
accept some version of the idea, associated earlier with Jellinek (1960: 337ff), of ‘the
normative power of the factual’.57 Positive legal norms stem from certain factual
situations; they have their origins in facts.58
One of the factual conditions necessary for the operation of the law is identified by
Schmitt, according to whom the authoritative decision regarding the friend/enemy
distinction is the key, for this sustains a political community (and its legal system) by
protecting it (and its fundamental laws) against an external, as well internal, enemy.
The rest is routine; but the routine is made possible by the exceptional circumstances
in which critical decisions to use violence against the enemy are taken in the sovereign
act of the political community.
One important qualification needs to be entered here. Schmitt was in fact
dismissive of the idea of the ‘normative power of the factual’ which, in Jellinek’s
version, gave a psychological explanation of the emergence of customary law.59 The
contention here, however, is simply that the operation of the law depends, among
52 Kelsen, Pure Theory, p. 193.
53 Kunz, ‘The ‘‘Vienna School’’ ’, pp. 87–8.
54 Kelsen, Pure Theory, p. 216.
55 Kelsen, General Theory, p. 369. The legal validity of customary international law derives from this
basic norm. One of the customary legal principles is pacta sunt servanda, from which flows
treaty-based international law. Another is what Kelsen calls the principle of effectiveness, which
acknowledges a constitution that is, by and large, effectively a legally valid one. From a valid
national constitution then follow all the national legal norms and decisions: Kelsen, General Theory,
pp. 366ff. The idea that positive international law contains within it the principle of effectiveness is
tantamount to the idea that international law acknowledges certain facts (such as a successful
revolution or coup d’état) as creating legal obligations. Kelsen needs to claim that positive
international law contains the principle of effectiveness to sustain his subscription to the Humean
position.
56 Kelsen came to acknowledge that his basic norm was a fiction – as ‘the ought’ of the basic norm
was not backed by a will. See Alf Ross, Directives and Norms (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,
1968), p. 158.
57 Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, pp. 337ff.
58 It does not follow that the content of the law can be entirely arbitrary. According to Hart, certain
facts of life shape a range of general principles which it is rational/functional for national legal
systems to incorporate. H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). It does
not follow either that it is impossible or inappropriate to try to assess the ethical validity of positive
law.
59 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 3; Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, pp. 337ff.
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other things, on the fact that sovereign political decisions are made. Decisions, of
course, involve making a judgement each time – very unlike the process Jellinek
himself had in mind under the rubric of the ‘normative power of the factual’.
It may be supposed that, according to Schmitt, sovereign power is a dormant
potentiality that becomes activated in the face of critical circumstances. Schwab
writes that Schmitt’s ‘sovereign slumbers in normal times but suddenly awakens
when a normal situation threatens to become an exception’.60 But this picture
obscures the fact that, according to Schmitt, the state of exception is a matter for a
sovereign decision (and not mere acknowledgement) and also neglects the constant
operation of sovereignty in routine circumstances.
The state of exception, in which the routine operation of the law is suspended, is
not radically discontinuous with the routine, but only an extreme case where the
element of decision integral to, and necessarily present to varying degrees in, the
operation of any normative system, is maximalised. According to Agamben, Schmitt
maintained that a (legal) ‘decision can never be derived from the content of a norm
without a remainder’.61 Application of law to concrete cases is not like a logical
subsumption of a particular under the general, but reflective, enunciative and backed
by institutional powers – a point which, it is important to notice, Kelsen also
acknowledged.62 The state of exception, in which the element of decision integral to
any operation of the law is maximalised, however, differs from anarchy and disorder;
in the state of exception, ‘order in the juristic sense still prevails’ as ‘the state remains,
whereas law recedes’.63 The routine circumstance, then, is where the law operates
more or less fully within the order present in the state.
Schmitt’s sovereignty then is not a dormant potential that becomes suddenly
activated in the face of crises, but embedded in a routine practice – what I wish to call
‘the practice of sovereignty’ – whereby an ultimately unauthorised authority continu-
ously authorises itself as the authority and the rest by and large accept this, acquiesce
in this, or are made to do so. I say ‘ultimately unauthorised’ here in the sense that
there is no independently valid ‘basic norm’ that validates the authority. Of course,
the state authority’s rule is invariably accompanied by some justificatory account in
terms of security, democratic participation, independence from the oppressor, racial
or ethnic unity, a good/correct form of life, and so on. But, in my view, the essence
of the practice of sovereignty lies in the fact that the justification, integral to the
practice of sovereignty, is never complete yet the authority is asserted and by and
large accepted, though not unchallenged.64
We should note here that Kelsen’s doctrine of the basic norm (as a commanding
principle of a legal system) is a way of restating (or articulating) what goes on in the
minds of ‘the rest’ when they, perhaps even forgetting that they are acquiescing,
conceive of the ultimately unauthorised authority as the authority. And the idea of
60 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. xviii.
61 Georgio Agamben, State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 2005), p. 36.
62 Kelsen, Pure Theory, pp. 348ff. According to him, the idea that legal norms have only one true
meaning is a fiction; for the law to be operative, it must be interpreted by a law-applying organ; and
the law-applying organ’s interpretation – which he says is ‘necessarily authentic’ – is not an act of
cognition, but of will, involving discretion.
63 Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 12.
64 Such a practice is widespread in society and is not confined to the operation of the state. ‘State
sovereignty’ and the ‘practice of sovereignty’ are not the same.
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the sovereign international legal system – towards which Kelsen was sympathetic,
and to which Verdross and Kunz subscribed – derives from the Vienna School’s
singularly ‘normativistic’ belief that for an unauthorised authority at the national
level to be treated as an authority at all, it must logically be deemed to have received
authorisation from a higher system of norms, that is, the system of positive
international law.
Here I may add that the more empirically-minded members of the English School
have eschewed such ‘normativism’. Thus, according to Manning:
The authority of the state derives . . . from its constituted power; its power from the
disposition towards it of those over whom it claims authority. What Austin called ‘the
habitual obedience of the bulk of the community’, and what MacIver called ‘the will for
the state’, is basic to the very existence of the state – and is the source of its power, and
hence of its authority.65
And, according to James: ‘legitimacy in governed societies is finally based on nothing
more – but nothing less – than a significant congruence between the decisions of those
who purport to rule and the actual behaviour of their alleged subjects’.66
The conceptions of sovereignty advanced by Schmitt and Kelsen appear far apart;
yet they are, in their own ways, trying to make sense of their common experience of
the social universe in which the practice of sovereignty is deeply embedded. One way
to express this point may be to say that the two legal theorists’ differing conceptions
of sovereignty are commensurate at the level of their social ontology.
Implications of sovereignty
I have so far examined two conceptions of sovereignty, Kelsen’s and Schmitt’s, and
identified the practice of sovereignty as uniting the two conceptions ontologically. By
Kelsen’s conception I mean his idea of state sovereignty as Völkerrechtsunmittel-
barkeit; and by Schmitt’s I mean his idea of the state as an authoritative entity in
decisive cases. I want now to take a brief look at what sovereignty means in the sense
of what follows from it. In particular, I want to offer a critical observation on some
widely accepted notions: that non-intervention follows from sovereignty and that
state sovereignty stands in the way of internationalist and cosmopolitan projects
while breeding arbitrary violence domestically.67 Due to space limitation, however,
the discussion centres on conceptual elucidation.
Non-intervention
It is usually taken for granted that the principle of non-intervention is a consequence
of state sovereignty.68 Does the concept of state sovereignty logically entail the
65 Manning, ‘The Legal Framework’, p. 307, emphasis original.
66 James, Sovereign Statehood, p. 155, emphasis added.
67 I am using a blanket term ‘to follow from’, which covers at least three distinct items: (supposedly)
logical entailments of a particular conception of sovereignty; empirical effects of the prevalence of a
certain conception of sovereignty; and empirical effects of the practice of sovereignty. I say
‘supposedly’ because, as will be explained, there is a problem with the idea of a logical entailment of
a concept. See W. V. O. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, in his From a Logical Point of View:
Logico-Philosophical Essays, 2nd edn. (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 20–46.
68 For example, we find in one North American textbook that I picked at random: ‘Sovereignty . . .
means that states are not supposed to interfere in the internal affairs of other states’. Joshua
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principle of non-intervention, however? If we follow Kelsen, the answer is clearly in
the negative: what a state legally ought or ought not to do to another state can only
be answered by interpreting positive international law. There can be no a priori
answer to the range of circumstances, if any, under which states may legally resort to
forceful intervention.69 Thus, for example, the question of whether and under what
conditions it is legally permissible for states to resort to humanitarian intervention is
not one that can be answered by analysing the concept of state sovereignty itself (or,
for that matter, the idea of ‘humanity’). The argument to the effect that the principle
of non-intervention is implicit in the concept of sovereignty only works by first
unconsciously/unreflectively feeding the principle into the concept and then deducing
it from the concept on a mistaken belief that the principle was there a priori.
The following analogy may be instructive here. If two people are ‘married’ to each
other, we may suggest that it follows logically from the very idea of ‘marriage’ that
one of the two, and only one of the two, is a male person. But this is only true in a
world in which heterosexual marriage alone counts as ‘marriage’. And it is this social
convention that makes us say that one, and only one, of a married couple is a male
person. In other words, what is claimed to be a logical implication of a concept has
been read into the concept in advance of our logical operation by the convention
under which we live.70 This is exactly analogous to the case where the principle of
non-intervention is said to be logically implicit in the very concept of state
sovereignty.
A related argument to the effect that the principle of non-intervention is implicit
in the principle of sovereignty, which is central to Vincent’s classical work on the
subject, is no better.71 Having defined ‘sovereignty’, in line with Hinsely’s oft-quoted
formula,72 as a state of affairs in which ‘there is a final and absolute political
authority in the political community’ and ‘no final and absolute authority exists
elsewhere’, Vincent concludes: ‘[i]f a state has a right to sovereignty, this implies that
other states have a duty to respect that right by, among other things, refraining from
intervention in its domestic affairs’.73 However, Vincent does not explain whether or
on what grounds states can be said to have a right to sovereignty in his sense. Kelsen
would respond that this right, like the duty of non-intervention itself, is located in
(historically contingent) positive international law. If the principle of sovereignty
logically entails the principle of non-intervention, it is because positive international
law gives the former a (historically contingent) substantive content – that sovereign
states must be free of forceful interference by other states against their political
Goldstein, International Relations (New York: Longman, 2004), p. 90. Quoting Mohammed Ayoob,
Cunliffe writes that sovereignty ‘acts as a ‘‘no trespassing’’ sign protecting the exclusive territorial
domain of states’. Cunliffe, ‘Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility’ (see n. 16 above), p. 38.
69 The same point can be made on the basis of James’s observation that ‘sovereignty’ understood as
‘constitutional independence’ is a factual condition, Sovereign Statehood, p. 48. From the mere fact
of a given state’s constitutional independence, no international legal principle can logically follow
regarding whether and under what conditions its independence ought to be respected by other
sovereign states. For this, we need to know the law itself.
70 The more powerful the convention, the less we realise that it is the force of the convention that is
doing much of the logical work. The most powerful of all may be logical principles themselves.
71 R. J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1974), passim.
72 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (London: Watts, 1966), p. 26, emphasis original.
73 Vincent, Nonintervention, p. 14, emphasis original.
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independence and territorial integrity – of which, it should be clear, Vincent’s
principle of non-intervention is a simple restatement.
Vincent’s insistence that the principle of sovereignty comes first, from which the
principle of non-intervention is logically deducible, is part of his rhetorical move to
accord a fundamental status to the principle of non-intervention within the contem-
porary system of sovereign states. But the exact content of the principle of
non-intervention is historically contingent and it is partly through finding out what
it prohibits that we come to know what rights sovereign states enjoy within a given
system or ‘what sovereignty means’ in that system.
It is, of course, only a short step from this Kelsenian stance to the position to
which IR constructivists and institutional historians subscribe – that sovereignty (or
‘what sovereignty means’ in the sense in which we are discussing the subject) is a
historically contingent social and political product, a dependent variable. Thus
Christian Reus-Smit views ‘sovereignty as a variable, practically constituted institu-
tions, its precise content and political implications varying with time and context’;
and Janice Thomson suggests strikingly, ‘If international relations theory is to
produce a theory of change, there is no better place to begin than with sovereignty’.74
Schmitt would of course reject such a non-essentialist line of thinking about
sovereignty. He characterised the enemy as he who ‘intends to negate his opponent’s
way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one’s own
form of existence’.75 Repulsing and fighting such an enemy, according to him, is a
right of any sovereign state. It is unclear whether Schmitt considered that a
correlative duty not to ‘negate his opponent’s way of life’, that is, duty of
non-intervention, follows on from the primordial right of sovereignty.76 But, more
fundamentally, it is unclear whether the right to repulse, in Schmitt’s sense, is meant
to be an international legal right and whether the duty of non-intervention, if he did
indeed consider this to be a correlative duty, was also an international legal
obligation. He merely asserted, as if it is in the nature of things, that such a right is.
He could perhaps be understood as saying that international law needs to acknowl-
edge such a (to his way of thinking, primordial) right, but I suspect his claim was
stronger. For Schmitt, this right was primordial because he saw the essence of the
political in human intergroup enmity, conflict and violence.77
Regarding what I have called the ‘practice of sovereignty’ – whereby an ultimately
unauthorised authority continuously authorises itself as the authority and the rest by
and large accept this, acquiesce in this, or are made to do so – it is difficult to know
what follows from it and, in particular, whether this has had any causal impact on the
content of international law with respect to non-intervention. But the practice of
sovereignty would appear at least consonant with the practice of non-intervention
between the authorities. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the authorities would be
74 Reus-Smit, ‘Human Rights and the Social Construction of Sovereignty’, Review of International
Studies, 27 (2001), p. 538; Thomson, Mercenaries, p. 153. See also Cynthia Weber, Simulating
Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995); and Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social
Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
75 Schmitt, The Concept, p. 27.
76 On Schmitt’s idea of non-intervention between a number of Great Power blocs, see his
Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für raumfremde Mächte (Berlin:
Deutscher Rechtsverlag, 1939).
77 See Williams, The Realist Tradition, p. 89, note 23.
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reinforced by the enshrinement of the principle of non-intervention in the system of
norms that govern their relationships. We may therefore expect the principle of
non-intervention to become broadly accepted by sovereign authorities.
However, if there emerges a hegemonic authority or a hegemonic bloc, it may try
to universalise a pursuit of certain values which it claims are integral to its legitimacy,
for example, the pursuit of certain human rights. Such a universalistic self-assertion
of a hegemonic authority, while not entirely undermining the principle of non-
intervention, may come to alter its application in a range of circumstances as we
witnessed in the nineteenth century Great Power practice of intervention. It is also
possible that some qualifications to the general principle of non-intervention come to
be accepted – along the lines envisaged, among others, by Nick Wheeler78 – through
a gradual emergence of a more worldwide consensus regarding what clearly
delegitimises an authority to govern.
In summary, a commonly held view that the principle of non-intervention follows
straightway from state sovereignty conceals a number of problems. Schmitt’s
conception of sovereignty, as containing the right to repulse interveners, may or may
not be thought to entail a correlative duty not to intervene in the first place. But a
more basic problem with the Schmittian line lies in the uncertainty regarding the legal
standing of his alleged sovereign rights. Importantly, the Kelsenian conception of
state sovereignty (or its variant found in Manning/James) does not logically entail the
legal principle of non-intervention and points to the historically contingent nature of
the substance of legal norms relating to sovereign governance and limits to
intervention. In the world of sovereign states, there may be a strong tendency for the
general principle of non-intervention to become accepted internationally, but its
precise content is historically variable, depending on the material and ideational
circumstances that prevail.
Sovereignty’s pernicious effects
State sovereignty is often assumed to get in the way of developing international
co-operation.79 There is also a cosmopolitan critique of state sovereignty as
inherently exclusionary.80 Furthermore, there is a view that subjection of life to
arbitrary violence is an unavoidable consequence of state sovereignty. Here I wish to
make some brief observations on each of these common contentions in turn.
We may begin by noting that there is nothing in the Kelsenian conception of
sovereignty to prevent sovereign states from concluding any treaty that widens
or deepens international cooperation. Sovereign states can also agree to a treaty
78 N. J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000).
79 In one popular textbook of IR, we find: ‘Sovereignty and the legal principles derived from it shape
and reinforce international anarchy’. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World
Politics: Trend and Transformation, 7th edn. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), p. 507.
See also M. R. Fowler and J. M. Bunck, Law, Power, and the Sovereign State: The Evolution and
Application of the Concept of Sovereignty (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1996), pp. 157ff.
80 Andrew Linklater, ‘Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State’, European Journal of
International Relations, 2 (1996), pp. 77–103; The Transformation of Political Community
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998).
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that accords supranational competences to an overarching body, or even, under
exceptional circumstances, to sign off their sovereign statehood altogether. There is,
in other words, no necessary limit to the range or level of cooperation that could in
principle take place between at present sovereign states. But, of course, the growth of
international cooperation is a slow process because states would generally be hesitant
to reduce the legal freedoms they currently enjoy – which, as Manning had noted in a
passage quoted earlier, is one possible meaning of ‘sovereignty’.
The related idea of state sovereignty as ‘constitutional independence’ may,
however, be thought to hinder a cosmopolitan pursuit to reduce those areas in which
the outsiders are treated differently from the insiders.81 But there is nothing in the
idea that a given political community is constitutionally independent which logically
forces a conclusion that it cannot pursue a policy that takes into account the welfare
of its outsiders – along the lines famously envisaged by E. H. Carr among others.82 It
may be asked how far along this path a sovereign state can proceed without ceasing
to be a sovereign state. The Kelsenian approach would reply that it would not lose
its sovereign status until it joins a federation or perhaps become part of a
neo-medieval institutional arrangement.83 Until that point is reached, cosmopolitan
goals are pursued without thereby contradicting the juristic status of the sovereign
states concerned.
Of course, this by no means suggests that sovereign states will be easily persuaded
to pursue cosmopolitan goals. In general, they would be just as keen to preserve their
existing freedom to treat citizens and foreigners differentially as they are to maintain
their current international legal liberties. But at least they could not present a
supposed conceptual incompatibility between cosmopolitan policies and state sover-
eignty as a reason for their inability to implement them. Nor do those who argue for
the pursuit of cosmopolitan policies need to feel that state sovereignty as such, in the
Kelsenian sense, would get in the way.
However, if the Kelsenian conception of state sovereignty is relatively benign, or
at least neutral, with respect to the possibility of the furtherance of internationalist
and cosmopolitan goals, that may be a sufficient reason for doubting the relevance of
the Kelsenian conception to the practice of international politics. The thought here
is that state sovereignty does get in the way of internationalist and cosmopolitan
projects and that therefore any conception of state sovereignty that fails to reveal this
is inadequate. A more adequate conception, it may be suggested, is found in the
writings of Schmitt.
What follows strictly logically from the Schmittian conception of sovereignty in
relation to international cooperation and cosmopolitan projects is hard to spell out
precisely, however. In his view, sovereign political communities are those which have
a freedom, readiness, and capacity to decide for themselves whether and when to fight
against whom.84 This does not mean that international politics is always warlike.
Schmitt wrote:
81 Linklater, ‘Citizenship’, pp. 94–5, p. 100, note 11, referring to James’s work.
82 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan 1939).
83 On neo-medievalism, see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,
3rd edn. (London: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 245–6.
84 De Gaulle’s decision to equip France with an independent nuclear force and withdraw French forces
from NATO is one illustration of the Schmittian conception of sovereignty.
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It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every
political deed a military action, by no means as though every nation would be
uninterruptedly faced with the friend-enemy alternative vis-à-vis every other nation. And,
after all, could not the politically reasonable course reside in avoiding war?85
Even in the world in which the Schmittian conception prevails, particular wars may
be avoided out of expediency.
Nevertheless, it is hard to suppose that Schmittian sovereigns, determined to
maintain their countries’ freedom, readiness, and capacity to decide ‘whether and
when to fight against whom’, would be seeker-afters of mutual gains through
institutionalised international collaboration – for at the rock-bottom, international
politics, according to his conception, is in the Hobbesian state of war.86 Furthermore,
Schmitt’s conception of sovereignty, which attaches central importance to the
political community’s ability to draw a line between its friend and enemy, would not
be conducive for any cosmopolitan project to take root – for, according to that
conception, the outsiders are at least as likely to be an enemy as a friend.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to reject Kelsen in favour of Schmitt.
Importantly, Kelsen’s conception of state sovereignty enables us to note that states
are subject to customary international law, one of whose key principles is that treaties
only bind those who give them consent. Sovereign states can, and do frequently,
hinder the progress of international and cosmopolitan projects by refusing to give
them their consent.
It may at this point be felt that we have finally reached the essence of state
sovereignty – that the state, as Kenneth Waltz opines, ‘decides for itself how it will
cope with its internal and external problems’.87 This line of thinking is consonant
with what I have been calling the practice of sovereignty: the subjects by and large
defer to their authority, not to others. There is also an obvious truth in Waltz’s
formulation in that any decision a sovereign state takes is formally attributed to the
state and to no other entity. However, crucially, states never decide for themselves if
by this is meant that they act in a social vacuum, entirely disregarding other (state
and non-state) entities and their own identities which are necessarily socially
constructed. As Ned Lebow rightly notes, ‘sociopaths aside, actors are neither
egoistic nor autonomous as those terms are understood by rational choice theories’.88
Sovereign states are autonomous only in their formal legal status.
What, finally, can we say of a possible relationship between sovereignty and
arbitrary violence? It is difficult not to take this relationship seriously, especially when
we learn, for example, about the Guantanamo Bay, the shooting of Jean Charles de
Menezes in July 2005, and so on.
The best way to make sense of the relationship between state sovereignty and
arbitrary violence of this sort is not to separate the Kelsenian and Schmittian
conceptions of sovereignty, but to consider what unites and underlies them. I have
suggested that these conceptions can be seen as effects or aspects of the two ways of
85 Schmitt, The Concept, p. 33.
86 See Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999) on limited transformative potentials of an international system from the more warlike
towards the more peaceable.
87 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 96.
88 Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), p. 311.
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making sense of the ‘practice of sovereignty’ – a routine practice whereby an
ultimately unauthorised authority continuously authorises itself as the authority and
the rest by and large acquiesce in this. Subjection of life to arbitrary violence, or its
constant possibility that becomes a reality in extreme forms at various times and
places, would seem embedded in such a practice. For the authority, originally
unauthorised, is bound to have resorted to arbitrary violence in its formative stages
and may have perpetuated that violence in its continued existence.89 In order to
implement its authority, the authority is in need of the law, but in order to defend
itself, the authority may need to suspend it in part in (what it judges to be) critical
circumstances. Furthermore, the routine operation of the law may itself involve
violence seen as arbitrary from some extra-legal standpoint.
If, therefore, the practice of sovereignty is closely, and perhaps inescapably,
intertwined with the infliction of arbitrary violence, it should also be acknowledged
that there are gradations; some types of sovereign states, under certain kinds of
conditions, produce more arbitrary violence, and are more prone to do so, than
others in other kinds of circumstances, and not everyone is subjected to the same kind
of arbitrary violence as everyone else. It would not help to ignore this,90 but, of
course, the differentiating conditions cannot be identified without a detailed empirical
study.
Short of embarking on such investigations, what we could say is this: with the
practice of sovereignty, the possibility of arbitrary violence is constantly present but
its actual instances may tend to be concealed from everyday observations. The
practice of sovereignty would lead at times to extreme manifestations of this
possibility when certain conditions are met. But if the practice of sovereignty is a
sufficient condition of the possibility of arbitrary violence (and its actualisation under
relevant conditions), it follows, by the force of logic, that the possibility of arbitrary
violence (and its actualisation under those conditions) is a necessary condition of the
practice of sovereignty. The implication is alarming: the continuation of the practice
of sovereignty requires the possibility of arbitrary violence (and its actualisation under
relevant conditions). A version of this alarming view of sovereignty is found in the
recently much-discussed works of Agamben, for example.91
To say, however, that the continuation of the practice of sovereignty requires the
possibility of arbitrary violence and its actualisation under relevant conditions is, of
course, not the same as saying that any particular manifestation of such a
potentiality, such as the concentration camp, is a necessary condition for the practice
of sovereignty: certain requisite conditions must be met in order for the possibility of
arbitrary violence to actualise and manifest itself in any concrete forms.92
89 Karena Shaw, ‘Creating/Negotiating Interstices: Indigenous Sovereignties’, in Jenny Edkins et al.,
Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 165–87.
90 See Judith Butler, Precarious Live: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004),
p. 68.
91 Goergio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). See also Edkins, Sovereign Lives.
92 This point is obscured when it is stated, for instance, that ‘[s]overeign power produces and is itself
produced by trauma: it provokes wars, genocides and famines’. Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the
Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. xv.
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Conclusion
In this article, I have examined two conceptions of sovereignty – those of Schmitt and
Kelsen – and have argued that, despite their apparent irreconcilability they are effects
or aspects of two different ways of making sense of the same social practice of
sovereignty.
Kelsen’s conception is relatively benign and points to the historically contingent
(and therefore potentially evolving) content of international law, giving an impetus to
a historical study of the evolution of legal norms. His conception also shows why
there is no logical or conceptual contradiction in pursuing international and
cosmopolitan projects within the framework of sovereign states. Against this,
Schmitt’s stance is that, in the world of sovereign states, the sovereign right of war
and the right to repulse interference are/ought to be enshrined in the system of norms
that govern international relations. If such a view strikes us too statically Hobbesian,
Schmitt’s conception is nevertheless effective in reminding us of what is concealed in
Kelsen’s ‘pure theory of law’ – that the operation of a legal system regularly involves
extra-legal decisions and judgements and that a routine operation of the law
presupposes the ability and willingness of the state to suspend the operation of the
law in critical circumstances in accordance with its own judgement and decision.
Thus it appears that the two authors’ contending conceptions of sovereignty
represent different entries into the subject that lead to divergent conclusions about
what sovereignty means. The prevalence of Schmittian conception would undoubt-
edly undermine the pursuit of international and cosmopolitan projects. But it would
not do to say the Schmittian conception should therefore be suppressed. The
Kelsenian and Schmittian conceptions are linked by the underlying practice of
sovereignty, which appears inescapably to be intertwined with the possibility of
arbitrary violence – although how it produces its concrete manifestations could not
be understood without a detailed historical and sociological analysis.
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